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Abstract
Technical trading strategies make profits by identifying and exploiting patterns
in market prices—patterns generated by the interaction of market participants.
Using a model market populated by individuals using a range of trading rules we
show that the presence of technical traders may be beneficial, in some cases reducing
volatility and increasing price efficiency. In particular, contrarian traders who base
their decisions on high frequency data have the largest positive effect. It is also
found that if technical traders condition their actions using ‘real time’ information,
they partially emulate arbitrageurs and make positive profits.
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1 Introduction
There is a long-standing debate surrounding the ability of rational arbitrageurs to drive
noise traders out of financial markets. While prominent work has forcibly argued the
case for noise traders being driven out of markets e.g., Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965),
others have identified conditions under which they may persist, e.g. De Long et al.
(1990). In this paper, we analyze market ecologies, combinations of traders using different
strategies, in order to understand the situations in which technical traders may make long
term positive returns. We conclude that, while in many circumstances fundamentalist
traders make the highest returns, both trend following and contrarian traders may make
positive profits, dependent on the market mechanism.
We consider a market populated with homogeneous fundamentalists and heterogeneous
technical traders. Fundamentalists trade on departures of the realized price from its un-
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derlying value, whilst chartists1 trade on patterns in historical prices. Trader demands—
channeled through a Walrasian auctioneer—determine the realized market price, which in
turn determines the flow of wealth between different strategy types. In implementing the
technical trading rules, we use the notion of an acceptable risk-adjusted level of profitabil-
ity. This enables buy/sell signals to be mapped to price expectations, thus enabling the
construction of an ecology of diverse, realistic trading rules. By allowing the inclusion of
a large variety of trading strategies, we are able to assess the impact of a complex range
of strategy interactions and draw conclusions about the likelihood of their survival.
Fundamentalists and technical traders observe the same freely available fundamental
value. Technical traders, however, pay no attention to this value, instead relying on a
variety of trading rules commonly investigated in the empirical literature and employed
by real-world traders. These include the ‘trend following’ momentum, moving average
and channel rules. Natural counterparts to these trend following rules are contrarian
rules, which we model by reversing trend following signals from ‘buy’ to ‘sell’ and from
‘sell’ to ‘buy’. Each rule has a single parameter, which is drawn from a set of values
that correspond to common data window sizes, such as weekly, monthly, quarterly and
semi-annual windows. Together with an ever-present fundamentalist strategy, we run a
simulation for each permutation of parameter values for the trend following and contrarian
strategy types.
Markets clear through a Walrasian auctioneer, who is tasked with finding an equilib-
rium price in each period. It has been common practice to construct traders’ demand
schedules using prices up to—but not including—the current price. This has the con-
venience of producing a smooth aggregate demand curve and a unique market clearing
price. However, what looks at first glance like a fairly innocuous assumption, creates a
market conducive to the profitability of positive-feedback strategies. We contrast this
setting with one in which traders condition their behavior on all prices up to the current
period, and henceforth we refer to ‘lagged prices’ and ‘real time prices’ Walrasian auction
protocols.
We first present results showing the volatility and efficiency of the markets. We find
that under the lagged information setup, volatility is reduced in the presence of trend
followers, while the difference between the fundamental price and the market price is lower
when there are more technical traders basing their decisions on short price windows. If
markets are dominated by contrarian traders using up to date information, there is a
risk of disconnection between the market price and the fundamental. The market may
experience low volatility, but a higher tracking error. In contrast, if trend following traders
are present in these markets, volatility is increased, but the disconnection is decreased.
We go on to analyze the effect of the market ecology on the profitability of trading
rules. We find that some initial trading rule endowments are more conducive to the
profitability of individual strategies than others, which we illustrate through the use of
sensitivity tables which capture average interaction effects. There is a clear message:
under the assumption of conditioning with respect to lagged prices, both fundamentalists
and trend followers accrue profits—at the expense of contrarians. In contrast, when using
the most up-to-date price information, not only do contrarian strategies outperform trend
followers, but they also accumulate long-run profits. Crucially, the overall level of profits
1We use the terms ‘technical trader’ and ‘chartist’ interchangeably. It is also common to refer to
fundamentalists as arbitrageurs.
2
and losses is much reduced in the real time protocol: the market seems better suited to
its primary purpose of providing prices that properly reflect fundamental value.
2 Related Literature
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (Fama, 1965) and the related Rational Expectations
Hypothesis (Muth, 1961; Lucas, 1972) formalized the Friedman (1953) notion that irra-
tional speculators will eventually be driven out by rational arbitrageurs. Critics of this
approach, however, argue that there is too high a computational burden imposed on agents
in order for them to calculate the rational expectations equilibrium. Real world examples
demonstrate this. For instance, investors seemingly failed to learn the lessons of the NAS-
DAQ crash: barely a decade later a new bubble developed, this time in the United States
real estate market, with subsequent dire consequences for the global financial system.
The idea that agents operate within ‘bounds of rationality’, or that they use rules of
thumb instead of complex calculations, can be traced back to Simon (1957) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1974). Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide more
recent examples of models in which heterogeneous agents learn using boundedly rational
rules. Within a simple cobweb model, Brock and Hommes (1997) describe an ‘adaptively
rational equilibrium’ in which heterogeneous agents choose between a costly rational ex-
pectations forecast or a costless naive forecast. The composition of the population evolves
according to feedback on the success of each strategy. The responsiveness of agents to
this feedback—the ‘intensity of choice’ parameter—determines whether there is a stable
rational expectations equilibrium. The Brock and Hommes (1998) adaptation of this evo-
lutionary learning mechanism to a simple asset pricing model is one contribution to a large
literature on simulation-based approaches to heterogeneous agent modeling. There are a
number of recent surveys of this literature, including Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006),
Chiarella et al. (2009) and Hommes and Wagener (2009).
A common feature of many models is the role played by technical analysis. A number
of influential survey articles have pointed to the emphasis placed by foreign exchange pro-
fessionals on this approach. Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) present
survey evidence from the London foreign exchange market. They find that 90 percent
of correspondents use technical analysis in forming exchange rate expectations, with a
particular emphasis on its use at short forecasting horizons. They suggest that chartists
may have an intuitive handle on nonlinearities in short-term exchange rate dynamics, but
that linear fundamental models prevail in the long run. For a recent discussion of hetero-
geneity in exchange rate expectations, see Menkhoff et al. (2009). Early empirical studies
focusing on foreign exchange include Sweeney (1986) and Levich and Thomas (1993),
while Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) survey the technical strategies used in these markets.2
Qi and Wu (2006) examine the common stock market rules of Brock et al. (1992) and
Sullivan et al. (1999) and apply them to foreign exchange markets.
In early exchange rate models, prices were formed by weighting the expectations of het-
erogeneous agents (Frankel and Froot, 1990). Frankel and Froot (1986) proposed a model
in which portfolio managers weight the forecasts of chartists and fundamentalists, using
Bayesian updating to refine those weights. The model is used to construct a hypothesis
2For a broader survey, encompassing other asset classes, see Park and Irwin (2007).
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for the excessive strength of the US dollar in the 1980s. De Grauwe et al. (1993) suggest
that the influence of fundamentalists’ expectations becomes more important the farther
the exchange rate is from its equilibrium. In their model, heterogeneous expectations are
used in the construction of a chaotic model of the exchange rate. These types of models
have been used to examine the consequences of policy intervention (Bauer et al., 2009;
Wieland and Westerhoff, 2005), the causes of excess volatility Bauer and Herz (2004),
or in the case of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005), to examine the effect of frictions on
exchange rate dynamics.
While the interaction of technical traders has been considered in foreign exchange
markets (and markets for assets more broadly, see for example Westerhoff and Franke
(2012); Phelps and Ng (2014)), the scope of those strategies analyzed has been limited.
The majority of models have focused on limited trader types and so have simplified the
complex interactions which may occur in these markets. In this paper, we analyze in
detail the effect of the ecology of trading strategies, examining how the presence of differ-
ent trader types may increase or decrease the profits of an investor following a different
approach. This analysis allows us to comment not only on the profitability of different
strategies, but also on the effect of technical traders on market behavior.
Our approach most closely follows the agent-based modeling of Brock and Hommes
(1997). This work, however, only considered a single technical trading strategy interacting
with a fundamentalist. In our paper, we incorporate multiple real world trading strategies
in the same market in order to model the ecology of interactions. In choosing the particular
strategies of our traders, we are influenced by the recent empirical results of Neely and
Weller (2013), who provide evidence of persistence in the performance of back-tested
adaptive technical analysis strategies in the foreign exchange market.
Building agent-based models with reference to the feedback from real-world foreign
exchange strategies creates an interesting divergence from some of the more recent ap-
proaches in the agent-based literature (Cristelli et al., 2011; Sornette, 2014). In this
literature, the trend has been to have individual strategies ‘fade out’ at the macroscopic
level (see, for example, Gontis and Kononovicius (2014)). As a result the effect of the
actions of a multitude of different traders is reduced to a stochastic process. This is in
contrast to recent papers in the economics literature such as (Palczewski et al., 2016;
Chiarella and Ladley, In Press) which model the behavior of specific technical trading
strategies and in some cases e.g. Chiarella et al. (2014); Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2014)
fit these strategies to market data. The two approaches are not entirely inconsistent,
however, as the empirical evidence presented by Neely and Weller (2013) demonstrates
individual strategies can enjoy long periods of profitability, only to ‘fade out’ as the market
adapts, but then ‘fade back in’ (returning to profit) in later years. This paper attempts to
bring together these views by showing how ecologies of traders may interact and produce
market dynamics.
3 The Model
We model the exchange of a risky and a risk-free asset. The risk-free asset is held in
domestic currency, whereas the risky asset is a foreign currency that yields a fixed rate of
interest. Trade occurs daily, with all positions closed before the beginning of the following
day and settled at today’s price. Trading takes place between a large number of funda-
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mentalist and technical traders through a single Walrasian auctioneer. At the beginning
of each trading day, the underlying fundamental value of the asset is revealed (at no
cost) to both the fundamentalists and the technical traders, but only the fundamentalists
incorporate it into their decision-making process.
Both fundamentalists and technical traders are mean-variance optimizers, with con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences. The auctioneer quotes a sequence of
prices and collects and aggregates the demand schedules of all traders. With no outside
supply of the risky asset, it is the auctioneer’s role to set the price that induces aggregate
excess demand to be as close to zero as possible.
3.1 Demand
All agents are modeled as having the exponential utility function
U(W ) = − exp(−λW ),
where the utility function U(.) is defined over wealthW and λ is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. If it is assumed that conditional wealth at time t+1 is distributed normally
with mean µ and variance σ2, then it can be shown that to maximize expected utility is
equivalent to maximizing the value of
µ− λσ
2
2
.
The one-period-ahead wealth equation is specified as
Wt+1 = (1 + r
∗)St+1Qt + (1 + r)(Wt − StQt), (1)
where r∗ and r are the rates of return on the risky and risk-free assets, respectively. The
interpretation of r∗ is a fixed rate of interest held in a foreign currency. We abstract from
sovereign default risk, so the volatility of the risky asset is due entirely to exchange rate
movements.3 Qt is the quantity of the risky asset purchased by the agent at time t and
St+1 is the spot price realized at time t + 1. Solving the agent’s maximization problem,
subject to this wealth constraint, gives the optimal quantity of risky asset demanded as
Q∗t =
(1 + r∗)Et[St+1]− (1 + r)St
λ(1 + r∗)2Vt[St+1]
, (2)
where Et[St+1] and Vt[St+1] are conditional expectations and variances of the future spot
price.
3.2 Expectations
Equation 2 gives the demand for the optimal quantity of the risky asset. The numerator
is interpreted as the expected excess return beyond the risk-free rate. This is composed
3Alternatively this asset could be interpreted as a stock, with the market being a standard asset
market. In this case r∗ would represent the (constant) dividend-price ratio for a stochastic stream of
dividend payments. Given the prevalence of technical trading in the FX markets, as set out above, we
define the model in these terms, however, the latter specification is also valid.
5
of dividends (or foreign interest earned) and capital gain from price movements. Traders
have heterogeneous expectations of the price, with fundamentalists expecting a constant
rate of convergence to a fundamental value and technical traders expecting an acceptable
risk-adjusted level of profitability. Technical traders differ in their strategies and through
the use of a diverse range of sample sizes of historical prices.
3.2.1 Fundamentalists
Fundamentalists’ expectations are driven by privileged access to the underlying funda-
mental value of the asset. For simplicity, we assume that they have free access to this
value4. We model the underlying fundamental value as a geometric Brownian motion.
After applying Ito’s Lemma, this gives the following process for the log of the value in
discrete time:
lnYt − lnYt−1 = µ− 1
2
σ2 + ztσ,
where Y (t) is fundamental value, zt is an i.i.d. draw from a standard normal distribution
and µ and σ are constants. Under the assumption that there is no drift term, µ = 0, the
equation for the evolution of the fundamental value is
ln(Yt/Yt−1) = zt σ − 1
2
σ2. (3)
Fundamentalists buy the risky asset when it is under-priced relative to its fundamental
value, and sell it when it is overpriced. They do so with increased confidence the farther
the asset is trading from its true level. They form expectations according to the rule
Et[St+1] = St + γ(Yt − St), γ ∈ [0, 1] (4)
where Yt is the realization of fundamental value at time t and γ is the rate at which
fundamentalists expect the asset price to converge to its true level.
3.2.2 Technical Traders
A difficulty with the types of technical rules commonly examined in the empirical liter-
ature is that signals of the type ‘buy’, ‘sell’ or ‘hold’ are generated with no reference to
the quantity to be traded. A key contribution of this paper is to propose that simple
trading rules can be mapped into price expectations by using the notion of an accept-
able risk-adjusted level of profitability. Risk-adjusted performance metrics (RAPMs) in
the financial industry are dominated by the use of the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1964), with
variations such as the Sortino ratio (Sortino and van der Meer, 1991).5
Under the assumption that returns are i.i.d., the mean and standard deviation of the
daily returns of a strategy or portfolio are translated into an annualized Sharpe ratio
using the formula
SRannual =
252 · (µdaily − rdaily)√
252 · σdaily
, (5)
4The impact of a cost to acquiring this information would be an interesting extension.
5The Sortino ratio belongs to a general class of statistics which only consider the volatility of returns
below some target rate of return. Another example is the semi-variance measure, which only includes
those returns below the sample mean.
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where µdaily is the mean daily return, rdaily is the risk-free rate and σdaily is the daily volatil-
ity of returns. Lyons (2001) points to the use of the Sharpe ratio as a performance metric
in banks and hedge funds. Grinold and Kahn (2000) and Menkhoff and Taylor (2007)
suggest that the benchmark used for committing capital is a Sharpe ratio of 0.5. The
daily expected return implied by a prior Sharpe ratio of 0.5 and Equation 5 corresponds
to an expected appreciation or depreciation of the asset price. The direction depends on
the current trading signal, leading to an expression for technical trader expectations of
Et[St+1] =
(
1 + rdaily +
It · SRannual · σdaily√
252
)
St, (6)
where It is the value of the trading signal ∈ {-1,0,1}.
3.3 Trading Rules
We select three classes of technical trading rules that tend to dominate the empirical
literature. As discussed above, the three rules do not offer obvious ways of using extrapo-
lation to derive point forecasts. Instead, they have been designed with a view to signaling
possible changes of trend, rather than being used as forecasting methods. We consider
trend following versions of these rules— as set out below—and contrarian versions, which
use the same rule, but simply reverse the sign of the output.
3.3.1 Momentum
In this study, momentum is defined as a simple threshold rule in which a buy signal is
given if the rate of change of prices is positive over a defined period, a sell signal is given
if the rate of change is negative, and in the rare case where there is no rate of change, a
neutral signal. Rate of change is measured with respect to the endpoints of the sample
only; no attempt is made to model the rate of change by incorporating all of the sample
observations. Much of the literature on momentum is equity-based (Chan et al., 2000;
Conrad and Kaul, 1998), but the general principle is the same across all asset types—
strong price movements are expected to follow strong price movements. The rule measures
whether the rate of change is positive or negative over a time period n, which includes
today’s price St
It(n) =


+1 if St > St−n
0 if St = St−n
−1 if St < St−n
3.3.2 Moving Average
Moving average rules vary with respect to the weighting scheme used (e.g. exponential
and simple) as well as with respect to the method of implementation, which can involve
several averages in combination. Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) discuss the method in which
a long position is taken upon a short period moving average crossing a long period moving
average from below, and a short position when the short period moving average crosses
the long period from above. Moving average combinations are also considered in Brock
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et al. (1992), Sullivan et al. (1999) and Qi and Wu (2006), amongst others. We use the
simple moving average
SMAt =
t∑
i=t−n
Si/(n+ 1)
The indicator function for the simple moving average rule is
It(n) =


+1 if St > SMAt
0 if St = SMAt
−1 if St < SMAt
The simple moving average is similar to the momentum rule except that the test condition
relates to the average of all the prices in the sample, rather than just the start and end
points.
3.3.3 Trading Range Breakout
Also known as a support and resistance or channel method, this trading style is event-
driven, in that the breakout is intended to signal a change in market conditions. Early
investigations of channel rules include Irwin and Uhrig (1984), Lukac et al. (1988) and
Taylor (1994). Several variants appear in the modern bootstrap-based studies. Brock
et al. (1992) consider channels of 50, 150 and 200 days, where a channel is defined as those
prices contained by a local maximum and minimum. It is argued that at these extremes
many investors are willing to buy or sell, with the minimum acting as ‘support’ and the
maximum acting as ‘resistance’; the eventual ‘breakout’ is deemed to be a significant
event. We use an n-day breakout indicator, where the indicator takes a positive value if
the most recent close is greater than the highest high of the previous n prices.
It(n) =


+1 if St > max(St−1, St−2, ..., St−n)
−1 if St < min(St−1, St−2, ..., St−n)
It−1 otherwise
At the start of the simulation, the indicator will be zero until the first breakout. The
indicator then maintains this value until a breakout occurs in the opposite direction.
3.4 Walrasian Auction Protocols
Trade is conducted through a Walrasian auctioneer. In the literature, the standard im-
plementation assumes traders use prices up to, but not including, the current price being
quoted by the auctioneer. This is a matter of convenience, as it provides smooth individ-
ual demand functions and a unique market-clearing price. However, it is a simplified view
of how technical traders behave. In this paper, we also consider an auction mechanism in
which expectations are adjusted contemporaneously with the sequence of prices quoted
by the auctioneer. We refer to the two auction protocols as ‘lagged’ and ‘real time’.
In both the lagged and the real time versions of the model, the current fundamental
value is revealed before trade. In both versions, fundamentalists adjust their expectations
contemporaneously with the auctioneer’s quote. The difference between the two mecha-
nisms lies in the way technical traders update their rules. For example, a trader using
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a lagged version of the breakout rule has already decided whether to be long or short,
irrespective of the auctioneer’s quote. His quantity depends on the difference between his
expectation of the price and the auctioneer’s quote. In contrast, a trader using the real
time version of the same breakout rule notes that quotes lying above (below) the current
maximum (minimum) channel threshold will result in a buy (sell) signal. The trading
signal for the current round of trade updates at the same time as the auctioneer’s quote.
These threshold values create discontinuities in the real time breakout trader’s demand
schedule. Discontinuities in the aggregate demand schedule follow.
Note we are still striving for a market clearing solution in each time step, so there
is a material difference between this paper’s real-time Walrasian auction and a market
making model in which the current price is known to traders. The market making model
perpetually trades out of equilibrium, with the market maker’s inventory taking up the
slack of excess demand or supply. Under the assumption of a risk-neutral market maker,
there are no bounds to the size of this inventory.
3.4.1 Lagged Price Information
[Figure 1 about here.]
With expectations formed from a combination of a trading signal It,i and a prior Sharpe
ratio SRannual, it can be shown that technical trader aggregate demand, as a function of
the current price quote St, is given by
DT (St) =
∑
i
It,i wi · SRannual
λ σ St ·
√
252
,
where i indexes the technical rules and wi is the proportion of the population using a
particular rule. Similarly, fundamentalist aggregate demand is
DF (St) =
wf γ(Yt − St)
λ σ2 S2t
,
where wf is the proportion of the population employing the fundamentalist strategy. With
no outside supply of foreign currency, adding DT and DF and setting to zero yields an
expression for the market clearing rate of
S∗t =
wf γ Yt
wf γ − 1√252 · λ σ
∑
i
It,iwi·SRannual
λ
. (7)
The lagged prices case treats It,i as exogenous in each time step, leading to a unique
market clearing price S∗t . This approach also has the advantage of a low computational
burden for the calculation of the market clearing price in each time step. Panel A of
Figure 1 illustrates this case.
3.4.2 Real-time Price Information
The setting of prices is more complex if traders condition their demand on the current
trade price. In the real time setting, It,i now becomes an endogenous variable of Equa-
tion 8:
9
S∗t =
wf γ Yt
wf γ − 1√252 · λ σ
∑
i
It,i(S∗t )wi·SRannual
λ
. (8)
Equation 8 makes explicit the joint determination of the market clearing price and
trading signals. This interaction may produce discontinuities in the demand curve which
are a result of discontinuities in the trading rules, i.e., points at which traders change the
nature of their demand. The result of this is that there are three qualitatively different
scenarios which do not fit with the concept of a single market clearing price. The first,
in Panel B of Figure 1, shows an example in which the discontinuities do not preclude
the existence of an equilibrium or market clearing exchange rate. The curve crosses the
D(St) = 0 line at a unique point. The next possible outcome (Panel C) shows the non-
existence of an equilibrium crossing point. This raises economic as well as computational
questions. If the market cannot clear at equilibrium, where does the market trade? And if
the market trades out of equilibrium, how is excess demand dealt with? In this example,
just as the demand curve is about to intersect the zero line, certain strategies adjust their
signals so as to create gaps both before and after the likely crossing point. Finally, by
updating their information sets to include the current quote, traders can generate multiple
equilibria (Panel D) leading to the question of which price should be chosen.
Additional assumptions need to be made about how the auctioneer goes about calcu-
lating the traded price for each potential scenario. Whilst in some cases it may be possible
to use a technique such as the bisection method, in general the potential multiple or zero
crossing points mean this is not possible. It is therefore necessary to use a computationally
demanding search. We define the set of prices considered as: {SL, SL + δ, ..., SU − δ, SU},
where SL marks the lower limit of the search range, δ is the price increment, and SU is
the upper limit. In all cases, δ = 0.001 or 10 basis points, which we judge to be a fair
trade-off between precision and speed6. The boundary conditions are obtained by com-
puting the market clearing price that would occur if all technical traders were buyers or
if they were all sellers. This is achieved by setting all trading signals, It,i, to either +1 or
−1 in Equation 8. In each case, we select the price with minimum excess demand. Since
the set of search prices is discrete, the excess demand will never be zero. The auctioneer
deals with this by rationing members of the larger group in proportion to individual de-
mands. In essence, the auctioneer operates as an order matcher. An alternative would be
for them to store excess quantity in a similar manner to a market maker. However, this
would potentially add or remove wealth from the trading environment, and complicate
the dynamics.
4 Results
We consider markets containing combinations of the six classes of trading strategies de-
scribed above (momentum, momentum contrarian, moving average, moving average con-
trarian, breakout and breakout contrarian) using four different historical sample sizes:
n ∈ {5, 21, 63, 126}. These values were chosen to represent psychologically important
periods of a week, a month, a quarter and half a year. In total, this gives 6 × 4 = 24
6Our simulations are intended to represent trading at the daily frequency, so it may be more appro-
priate to use a finer precision for simulations which are intended to capture activity at higher frequencies.
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different technical trading strategies. Assuming the fundamentalist strategy is present
within all simulations, this gives 224 = 16, 777, 216 possible strategy combinations. Each
strategy within a simulation is allocated an equal share of the population i.e., 1/n.7 For
each combination of trading strategies, we perform 1000 repetitions of the simulation,
with different underlying time series of fundamental value. The same underlying price
series are used for all trader combinations, ensuring that variations are due to agent in-
teractions. Each simulation runs for 3024 days (12 years), with each day consisting of a
single market-clearing time step. Data is only recorded for the final 2520 days (10 years)
in order to allow the rules with longer windows to base their behavior on market data.
The volatility of log returns in the underlying geometric Brownian motion is 1% and we
assume that all traders use this value as their estimate of future volatility. Hence, het-
erogeneous expectations of future volatility are not driving realized volatility8. All risk
aversion parameters are set to 1, and all prior Sharpe ratios are set to 0.5. Note, as long
as they are identical across individuals, neither of these parameters qualitatively affect
results as they merely scale the size of investment that traders make. The fundamental-
ists use a convergence parameter of 0.01: they expect 1% of the difference between the
actual price and the underlying value to be eradicated each day. The dimensionality of
the simulation problem is reduced by holding the fundamentalists’ parameter fixed at this
value. These parameters are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
4.1 Market Statistics
We first present results showing the effect of the composition of the population of traders
on market behavior. We focus on two aspects: efficiency—as measured by the mean
squared error between the market prices and the underlying fundamental price—and price
volatility. Statistics are calculated for each permutation of the 224 technical strategies.
Results are presented for each trading rule averaged over all simulations in which they are
present. The first column contains the average volatility over all simulations for each type
of trader. The remaining columns give the volatility, as a percentage of the base volatility,
for the case when traders using a particular window size for the rule are present. Note
since these values are percentages relative to the mean and trend followers and contrarians
take opposite decisions at all times the values are symmetric around 1.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 presents the results for price volatility. In line with previous findings (Chiarella
et al., 2009; Hommes and Wagener, 2009), the technical traders have a significant effect on
the dynamics of the market price. There is, however, a surprising difference between the
7This decision was partially made to bound the analysis to a computationally tractable number of sim-
ulations. Experiments were, however, performed for a limited number of cases with non equal population
sizes. The results of interactions were found to be qualitatively similar to those presented below.
8Endogenous estimation of volatility is an interesting avenue for future research. In the same manner
in which there are many ways to estimate prices, there are also many ways to estimate volatility, and
potentially many complex ways in which they could interact. We therefore leave this aspect to future
work, in order to focus on the dynamics of price rules.
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real time and lagged specifications. Volatility is approximately four times greater under
the lagged specification than the real time equivalent. This indicates that if traders use real
time information, the destabilizing effect of technical traders may be lower than previous
estimates suggest. Notably, however, the real time price volatility is itself approximately
three times higher than the underlying fundamental volatility. The use of real time
information allows traders to avoid some trading mistakes which destabilize prices. For
instance, a trader may avoid buying into a trend which was previously present, but which
does not persist in the current period.
The effect of different types of traders on volatility is not uniform. In the real time
setting, those markets which contain trend followers have higher volatility than those
containing contrarians. The contrarian traders act to dampen the market, resisting trends
in price changes. In contrast, trend followers actively move the price away from its current
value. In the lagged setting, the pattern is reversed. The contrarians, using out of date
information, destabilize the price. In many cases this is because their efforts ignore those
of the fundamentalist trader. For instance, if a trend appeared in period t− 1 away from
the fundamental, the fundamentalist would take a position which would act to correct this.
Contrarians would take a similar position (in reverse of the existing trend) making the
reversion larger. In contrast, trend followers would oppose the fundamentalist, reducing
the size of the reversion and consequently the overall volatility.
[Table 3 about here.]
The mean squared error between the market price and the fundamental price gives
a measure of the efficiency of the financial market: its ability to price an asset fairly.
Table 3 shows that this value is higher for the lagged case than the real time setting.
This is unsurprising, as the real time protocol uses more up-to-date information in the
calculation of prices, and therefore it should be expected that the fundamental price and
the market price will be closer.
Under the lagged protocol, short-period momentum and moving average traders de-
crease tracking error, whilst those with longer periods increase it (and vice versa for con-
trarians). In this setting, it is those traders who are most volatile in their opinions who
do most to make the market price accurate. This is because changes in the fundamental
value often take time to be incorporated into the price. For instance, a fundamental-
ist corrects mispricings by 1% per day, meaning there is some persistence in deviations.
Short period trend followers may inadvertently capture the trend associated with these
deviations, speeding up the mean reversion. Longer period traders, in contrast, may cap-
ture deviations which have already been corrected, and so move the price away from the
fundamental.
In the real time case, when contrarian traders are present, the tracking error is in-
creased. However, as Table 2 shows, this is accompanied by lower volatility. Whilst the
market may have been relatively calm, their is a disconnection between the market price
and fundamental value. In contrast, the higher volatility evidenced in this setting when
trend followers are present is associated with lower tracking error. The trend followers,
whilst causing volatility, must be moving the price back towards the fundamental price.
12
4.2 Profits
In this section, we consider the average profits of each trading strategy across all possible
market ecologies. We collect results for fundamentalists, trend followers and contrarians,
aggregating across time windows. We calculate average annual profits for each permu-
tation of the 224 technical strategies. Given that the number of strategies varies in each
ecology, we present our results as profits per trader.9 Total profit is calculated as the sum
of daily profits i.e. the profit to the trader from taking their desired position in day t and
liquidating that position on day t+ 1.10
[Figure 2 about here.]
The left column of Figure 2 presents the results for lagged information. The losses of
contrarian strategies largely feed the profits of the fundamentalists, who make positive
returns in all scenarios. There is also evidence that trend-followers gain from some of
these losses, as they benefit from positive-feedback effects. In this setting, there is little
difference between the trend-following momentum and moving average rules: both dis-
tributions are centered around zero and have long right tails. In contrast, the breakout
rule exhibits a tighter, symmetrical distribution. This is because the breakout rule, only
being concerned with the high or low of a range of prices, is insensitive to erratic price
movements within those bounds. The endpoints of the momentum rule and the value
of the moving average change with every new price—resulting in higher profit volatility,
which in some circumstances can result in very high gains.
In line with the price deviation results of the previous section, the right column of
Figure 2 shows that the absolute levels of profits and losses are much reduced when
technical traders update their orders contemporaneously with prices. We have accordingly
adjusted the range of the horizontal axes in the right column of Figure 2 to improve
clarity. This change in the way traders update their orders means that in each time step
each trader is behaving in a way they believe is the optimal manner—trading at a price
consistent with their beliefs. In the lagged price scenario, a trader’s actions are in essence
out of date. The direction of their trade may be the opposite of what would be desired
if the current market price were included. This seemingly innocuous change in the way
traders process price information limits the number of profit opportunities.
An examination of the composition of winners and losers reveals the driving force be-
hind this increased market efficiency. All of the trend-following strategies now accumulate
losses, with the fortunes of contrarians also reversing. In particular, the distribution of
the moving average contrarian strategies almost exactly matches that of the fundamen-
talists, suggesting that technical strategies can mimic arbitrage strategies if information
is processed in a timely manner.
It is clear that the ability of trend-following traders to push prices for their own benefit
is largely removed when the population as a whole updates prices in real time. In the
absence of positive-feedback effects, temporary deviations from fundamental value are
quickly eradicated by fundamentalists, who now face fierce competition from contrarians
9Calculated as gross profit divided by population share.
10Traders frequently do not change their position day to day. They could therefore be viewed as closing
and opening a position of equal size at the same price on day t+ 1. As a result this is equivalent to the
sum of the profits and losses of trading over the length of the simulation.
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for these limited wealth transfers. The limits to arbitrage have been overcome by those
members of the noise trading population who push prices back to equilibrium. This finding
also relates to the ‘hipster effect’ (Touboul, 2014). In our model contrarians are able to
synchronize and make profits in real time by opposing the trend in the market. However,
under the lagged market mechanism the increased delay leads to the same traders missing
opportunities and losing money.
4.3 Strategy Interaction
In this section, we consider the interaction of trading strategies, identifying those ecologies
that are most conducive to profit or loss-making for each type. Strategies are classified
both by rule type and by the size of the data window they use. The first column of
each table presents the unconditional mean of annual profits by strategy type across
all simulation in which that type of trader is present. White cells represent profitable
strategies, whilst gray cell represent loss making approaches. Subsequent columns measure
the impact of each alternative strategy type on the row type’s profit. These values are
averaged across all simulated ecologies where the column type and row type are both
present (potentially along with other types). For the columns we aggregate across window
lengths to aid comparison. Cells are shaded gray if the inclusion of that particular strategy
decreases profitability, and white if their inclusion is beneficial. For example, in Table 4
fundamentalist profits have an unconditional mean of 122.28. The inclusion of trend
following rules within the population diminishes these profits, whereas the inclusion of
contrarian rules—in particular moving average rules—increases profitability. For those
cells on the diagonal the traders own type are removed from the comparison as they are
always present. For example for breakout trend following traders with a window of 5 the
breakout trend following column contains the effect of breakout trend following traders
with all other window lengths. We have highlighted those strategies that have the largest
impact on profitability in bold-type.
Table 5 confirms the reduction in the scale of wealth transfers when traders use up-
to-date price information. Otherwise, the shading of the table matches that of Table 4,
but with one major difference: fundamentalists accrue greater profits when the rest of
the population is dominated by trend-following rules. The histograms demonstrate a
similarity between the distributions of fundamentalists and contrarians—Table 5 adds
further evidence that contrarians trade in the same direction as fundamentalists. Even
though the contrarians can be regarded as noise traders, they behave much the same as
fundamentalists, alleviating the limits to arbitrage evident in the lagged prices protocol.
Fundamentalists and trend followers benefit from the inclusion of contrarian rules,
but suffer from the inclusion of trend followers. Sensitivities are the opposite for contrar-
ians, who benefit from the presence of trend followers, but suffer in the presence of other
contrarians. The inclusion of traders of an opposite class provides strategies with individ-
uals willing to take opposite positions—leading to potentially greater volumes. However,
traders of the same type serve as competition. This leads to the symmetry of effects seen
in Table 4. For example for breakout traders with a time window of 5, trend following
moving average traders decrease profits by 2.05 whilst the presence of contrarian moving
average traders increase profits by the same amount. As the two groups always take the
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opposite actions the effects are equal and opposite.11 Table 5 shows a similar effect ex-
cept that there is some noise in the pairs of values. This is due to the equilibrium price
selection process. Random selection among multiple possible equilibrium prices inducing
a stochastic element to the payoffs. In general this effect is quite small, however, in cases
where the effect of a trading strategy on another is very small - such as for trend following
break out traders it can change the sign of the effect.
Within each class, it is evident that in the majority of cases strategies are most sensitive
to the inclusion of moving average rules, closely followed by momentum rules and, to a
much lesser extent, breakout rules. This reflects the frequency with which indicator
functions change sign. As highlighted above, the breakout indicator is measured with
reference to a range, which can remain unaltered for long periods. The indicators of
the other rules, however, are measured against values that change with each subsequent
price. The pattern observed for the longest window trend following momentum traders
in Table 4 is worthy of note. These traders do not show the same pattern as other trend
following momentum traders – they make significant losses. This is because these traders
are the slowest to respond to price changes - particularly when there have been large
previous price movements. The trading signal is based solely on the current price and
that 126 day’s ago. Whilst this price changes every day it can take a long time for it to
reflect large price changes. As a result the trader may buy into trends for long periods
that do not exist and miss new trends, resulting in all other traders exploiting them to
a lesser or greater extent. This effect will be particularly prevalent around times the
market changes direction - leading to the positive interaction with trend following break
out traders. A similar effect is seen for the contrarian momentum traders with window
126 except that the larger average losses for contrarian traders in general mean that this
effect is not sufficient to cause a change in sign.
[Table 4 about here.]
11It is worth highlighting that for those values on the diagonal this rule does not hold as the table
excludes the effect on traders of their own type. For instance for trend following break out traders with
a window of 5, the column giving the effect of other trend following break out traders does not have the
same value as that for contrarian break out traders. This is because the first column records the effect
of trend following break out traders with windows of 21, 63 and 126 whilst the second also includes the
effect of contrarian break out traders with a window of 5.
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[Table 5 about here.]
5 Conclusions
This paper has considered an environment in which ecologies of traders, consisting of mul-
tiple varieties of heterogeneous technical strategies, interact with fundamentalist traders.
We have utilized two different market protocols, one of which assumes that market partic-
ipants include the currently-being-determined price in their decision making. Fundamen-
talists submit demands based on an assumed rate of convergence to a known fundamental
level of a risky asset. Technical traders make decisions using historical windows of market
prices and by invoking the notion of the annual risk/reward profile of an ‘acceptable’
trading strategy.
We find that in many settings the presence of a technical trader reduces market volatil-
ity or increases the accuracy with which the market price tracks the underlying funda-
mental value. This is particularly true for trend following strategies based on short term
price patterns. In terms of the long-run profitability of strategies, when technical traders
use a lagged information set, trend following traders induce positive-feedback effects—
effects that benefit themselves, but cause contrarians to incur losses. The levels of profits
and losses in the market are substantial, indicating that market prices are doing a poor
job of instantaneously adjusting to the arrival of new information. The consequences of
the ‘real time’ setting, in which technical traders update their rules using the most up-
to-date information, are profound. Not only are the absolute levels of profits and losses
significantly reduced—as arbitrage opportunities are quickly eradicated—but contrarian
traders now join fundamentalists in profiting from this return to fundamental value. We
also show that the inclusion of competing strategies within an ecology can help or hinder
the profitability of individual strategies.
Our approach invites further development. The set of trading strategies considered in
this paper was constrained to a number which could be analyzed effectively. In reality,
there are many different classes of strategy which we do not consider, but whose presence
could radically affect the behavior of the market. This paper also focuses primarily on
profits, but an important next step is to analyze market dynamics over time in the presence
of changing population shares. If individuals adapt their strategy based on recent profits,
then the profile of profits in a particular ecology gives the instantaneous derivative of
population change. A detailed analysis of this type of dynamic would potentially allow
the identification of groups of strategies which lead to fixed populations, and those which
lead to chaotic mixes.
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Parameter Description Value
λ Risk aversion 1.00
σ Daily volatility 1%
SRannual Target risk-adjusted return 0.50
γ Fundamentalist convergence 1%
n Number of strategies [1, 25]
wi Population shares 1/n
Table 1: The table documents those parameters common to all simulations. Traders share the
same utility function, with coefficient of absolute risk aversion λ. The volatility of underlying
fundamental value and traders’ expected conditional volatility of returns is given by σ. Chartists’
prior notion of an acceptable strategy is SRannual and fundamentalists expect the exchange rate
to converge to fundamental value at the rate γ. Populations are allocated equal fractions of the
arbitrage strategy and [1, 24] technical strategies. Each simulation runs for 12 years.
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Trend Following Contrarian
Mean 5 20 63 126 5 20 63 126
Breakout 0.1201 0.930 0.965 0.981 0.986 1.070 1.035 1.019 1.014
Lagged Momentum - 0.855 0.869 0.895 0.940 1.145 1.131 1.105 1.060
Moving Average - 0.833 0.845 0.872 0.898 1.167 1.155 1.128 1.102
Breakout 0.0288 1.075 1.053 1.041 1.027 0.925 0.947 0.959 0.973
Real Time Momentum - 1.093 1.078 1.061 1.050 0.907 0.922 0.939 0.950
Moving Average - 1.113 1.095 1.073 1.060 0.887 0.905 0.927 0.940
Table 2: Table presenting the average price volatility of markets in which a particular trader
participates. The first column contains the average volatility of all simulations for the lagged
and real time cases. The remaining columns detail the volatility relative to the base case when
the specified trader type is present in the market.
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Trend Following Contrarian
Mean 5 20 63 126 5 20 63 126
Breakout 0.0150 1.030 1.042 1.028 1.025 0.970 0.958 0.972 0.975
Lagged Momentum - 0.972 0.998 1.011 1.043 1.028 1.002 0.989 0.957
Moving Average - 0.960 0.992 1.017 1.031 1.040 1.008 0.983 0.969
Breakout 0.0013 0.997 0.991 0.990 0.992 1.003 1.009 1.010 1.008
Real Time Momentum - 0.995 0.994 0.992 0.994 1.005 1.006 1.008 1.006
Moving Average - 0.980 0.994 0.993 0.994 1.020 1.006 1.007 1.006
Table 3: Table presenting the average mean squared error between the market price and the
fundamental for markets in which a particular trader participates. The first column contains the
average mean squared error of all simulations for the lagged and real time cases. The remaining
columns detail the mean squared error relative to the base case when the specified trader type
is present in the market.
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Trend Follower Contrarian
Mean Breakout Momentum Moving Average Breakout Momentum Moving Average
Fundamental - 122.28 -7.51 -28.97 -36.38 7.51 28.97 36.38
Breakout 5 1.51 0.27 -1.66 -2.05 0.82 1.66 2.05
21 -0.29 -0.20 -0.71 -0.89 0.36 0.71 0.89
63 -0.05 -0.16 -0.31 -0.39 0.18 0.31 0.39
126 0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.23 0.12 0.18 0.23
Momentum 5 11.09 -0.64 -3.96 -7.11 0.64 6.97 7.11
21 10.67 -0.54 -5.00 -6.97 0.54 6.97 6.97
63 10.49 -0.71 -5.34 -6.50 0.71 6.53 6.50
126 -0.95 0.21 -0.68 -1.39 -0.21 1.48 1.39
Moving Average 5 15.05 -0.63 -6.15 -7.06 0.63 6.15 8.90
21 13.91 -0.99 -6.43 -8.63 0.99 6.43 9.36
63 12.38 -1.16 -6.17 -8.66 1.16 6.17 8.92
126 10.88 -1.18 -5.69 -7.99 1.18 5.69 8.07
Breakout 5 -12.60 1.87 2.93 3.67 -0.16 -2.93 -3.67
Contrarian 21 -2.40 0.84 1.12 1.33 -0.51 -1.12 -1.33
63 -0.69 0.36 0.43 0.49 -0.30 -0.43 -0.49
126 -0.36 0.19 0.22 0.26 -0.19 -0.22 -0.26
Momentum 5 -48.71 2.13 12.05 13.96 -2.13 -8.86 -13.96
Contrarian 21 -43.46 2.33 12.42 13.67 -2.33 -9.91 -13.67
63 -37.78 2.45 11.60 12.63 -2.45 -9.75 -12.63
126 -16.33 1.10 4.83 4.58 -1.10 -1.97 -4.58
Moving Average 5 -51.04 1.76 10.91 14.76 -1.76 -10.91 -12.49
Contrarian 21 -43.88 2.28 11.23 15.47 -2.28 -11.23 -14.48
63 -37.98 2.57 10.72 14.86 -2.57 -10.72 -14.50
126 -33.16 2.58 9.94 13.52 -2.58 -9.94 -13.37
Table 4: Table presenting the average profits of traders. The first column contains the average
yearly profits of each trader type over all simulations in which they are present. The remaining
columns detail the effect on the average profits of the row trader of the presence of traders of
the column type. Traders are grouped by their rule type. Results are calculated for markets
using lagged price information.
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Trend Follower Contrarian
Mean Breakout Momentum Moving Average Breakout Momentum Moving Average
Fundamental - 4.95 0.34 0.58 0.73 -0.32 -0.56 -0.71
Breakout 5 -2.72 -0.04 -0.17 -0.18 0.12 0.16 0.17
21 -0.84 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02
63 -0.26 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.01
126 -0.11 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Momentum 5 -3.70 -0.14 -0.14 -0.24 0.12 0.36 0.22
21 -2.77 -0.10 -0.12 -0.16 0.08 0.27 0.15
63 -1.88 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.16 0.08
126 -1.40 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.12 0.04
Moving Average 5 -5.39 -0.18 -0.39 -0.38 0.16 0.37 0.59
21 -4.39 -0.18 -0.31 -0.35 0.16 0.29 0.45
63 -3.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.21 0.09 0.17 0.27
126 -2.36 -0.06 -0.12 -0.13 0.05 0.11 0.18
Breakout 5 1.93 0.14 0.27 0.34 -0.05 -0.25 -0.33
Contrarian 21 0.59 0.07 0.12 0.15 -0.06 -0.11 -0.14
63 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08
126 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
Momentum 5 2.17 0.13 0.29 0.45 -0.12 -0.24 -0.44
Contraian 21 1.74 0.11 0.26 0.38 -0.10 -0.24 -0.37
63 1.25 0.08 0.20 0.30 -0.07 -0.21 -0.29
126 0.91 0.07 0.17 0.24 -0.06 -0.18 -0.23
Moving Average 5 3.42 0.17 0.42 0.55 -0.15 -0.40 -0.50
Contraian 21 2.93 0.16 0.39 0.53 -0.15 -0.38 -0.49
63 2.18 0.11 0.29 0.42 -0.10 -0.28 -0.42
126 1.69 0.08 0.24 0.35 -0.07 -0.23 -0.37
Table 5: Table presenting the average profits of traders. The first column contains the average
annual profits of each trader type over all simulations in which they are present. The remaining
columns detail the effect on the average profit of the row trader of the presence of traders of the
column type. Traders are grouped by their rule type. Results are calculated for markets using
up to date price information.
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Figure 1: Market Clearing Scenarios. When technical traders condition their rules on lagged
prices, aggregate demand is smooth, yielding a unique market clearing price (panel A). But when
trading rule signals are synchronized with the auctioneer’s quote, discontinuities in individual
demand curves lead to discontinuities in aggregate demand. A unique clearing price is still
possible (panel B), but there is also the possibility of disequilibrium trading (panel C) and
multiple equilibria (panel D).
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Figure 2: Histograms of average annual profits for traders using lagged information (Left) and
real time information (Right). Top: Breakout rules, Middle: Momentum rules and Bottom:
Moving average rules. In each case the dashed line is for fundamentalists, the solid line is for
trend followers and the dotted line is for contrarians.
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